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around architectural aesthetics or even – its seems
so long ago now – the issues raised by the recent
competition for the wtc site, architecture and
urban space participate, at home and on the bat-
tlefield in, the anxiety of war at every level. And
Such anxiety indeed has become a condition of
modern life, if not the permanent condition of
modernity. From the London of Conrad’s Secret
Agent to that of Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway to the
“blitz neuroses” identified by psychiatrists during
the Second World War, to the horrors of London,
Coventry, Dresden, Hamburg, and Tokyo, to the
Paris of the Algerian war, to the Beirut of the civil
war, the London of ira explosions, and the daily
horror in Palestine and Israel, the urban environ-
ment has been embedded, to use a recently fash-
ionable term, in an ongoing war, and a more or
less consistent state of anxiety. After September
11, the issue of “security” dominated discussions
and proposals for reconstruction to the virtual
exclusion of issues to do with the qualities of
everyday life in cities that have been the province
of planners since Team X’s revolt against ciam and
Jane Jacobs’ revolt against Robert Moses.
But the anxiety analyzed by Freud, while relat-
ed to such ostensible reasons to be afraid, was of
another kind than that provoked by threats of
destruction or death: it is that low-grade anxiety,
sometimes heightened into phobia, that is pro-
voked by the space of life itself, an anxiety, no
matter what its deep causes, nevertheless haunts
our everyday life. In modern culture, this anxiety
has been identified and studied by psychologists in
the 19th century, and psychoanalysts in the 20th;
in earlier centuries it has been the concern of reli-
gion and philosophy. It is that anxiety felt by Pas-
cal in the 17th century – an anxiety in the face of
the void, the immensity of universal space – and
Freud and Lacan in the 20th century – an anxiety
of identity and the ego in the face of complexes
and neuroses. As I observed in my recent book
Warped Space, modern architecture, from the late
nineteenth century to the present has been con-
strued as a resistance to, or compensation for, this
anxiety, one which insofar as it is a spatial anxiety
has never been far from the preoccupations of
architects and their theoretical mentors. 
If indeed anxiety is a spatial construct – and
architecture (or rather modern architecture) as a
long-drawn out experiment in its exploration –
how might we get at this apparently intangible
phenomenon, one that might seem, in its psycho-
analytic formulation to bypass architecture, and
space, altogether in search of more fundamental
sexual etiologies? Certainly that was Freud’s con-
clusion, as he relegated all the spatial phobias that
had been identified by doctors in the late nine-
teenth century to the domain of sexual neuroses.
But later analysts, from Jacques Lacan to Sami-Ali
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Some months ago, when thinking of an appropri-
ate talk to give tonight, we were not at war; cer-
tainly the tragedy of the World Trade Center was
central to our concerns; certainly too, the compe-
tition for the rebuilding launched by the Lower
Manhattan Development Corporation was in its
initial stages. But we were not, at least officially, at
war. This evening, however, we think about archi-
tecture in another context, almost another world,
from that which we thought had already been rad-
ically changed enough by September 11, 2001.
And so it seems that any subject not directly con-
cerned with the present crisis, with the violence
and danger unleashed by this war, would be re-
duced to irrelevance, or at most a strange and dis-
connected incongruity. For what can we say here
about architecture that has anything to do with
such events? What does architecture, in any way,
have to do with such events?
One answer to this question of course has be-
come a truism in contemporary theory: all plan-
ning, all organization, in modern technological
terms shares and is implicitly complicit in all
realms of society, from war to peace, from the cor-
porate to the military, from the political to the cul-
tural. The organizational techniques, strategies,
and means of analysis and synthesis, are bound
together in a common culture of organization, and
have been most especially since the Second World
War: we daily reap the benefits of Turing’s discov-
eries and Norbert Weiner’s logic; the software we
use, its potential for spatial and programmatic
modeling, its animation effects, and its practical
manufacturing uses, are all the products of re-
search and development for war: historians such as
Reinhold Martin, Mauel De Landa, and Beatriz
Colomina have explored dimensions of these con-
nections within what Martin has generically
termed the “organizational complex.” 
But tonight I want to address another kind of
complex: that which Freud and his 20th century
heirs have termed anxiety. For in post-September
11 New York, we are, whether protestors, bystan-
ders, or even as sympathetic supporters, bound in
a common state of anxiety. Daily alerts – green,
yellow, orange, and red, indicate the level of chat-
ter that in turn points to a heightened probability
of terrorist attack; advisories as futile as those
which told us to duck under our school desks to
avoid the dangers of nuclear attack cause runs on
duck tape and surplus gas masks; helicopters hover
with chemical and nuclear sensors around mid-
town Manhattan. Anxiety in this context can never
be focused but it is always there. On entering the
sub-way; in an elevator to a high floor; in a mall or
department store; public and private space is in-
vaded by this vague but tangible anxiety. 
And so, while it surely does not seem to be the
time to engage in debates “on the head of a pin”
and Felix Guattari, and philosophers like Gilles
Deleuze, have proposed models of anxiety that are
spatial, whether optically or topologically formu-
lated. Space is, in these terms, not only the locus
of anxiety, but its internal structure. Further, since
each of these spatial models of anxiety in psycho-
analysis is historically and culturally specific, each
can be seen as the interpretant, so to speak, of its
analogues in architectural form, while at the same
time remaining as an important interpretative
point of reference for modernism in general. 
What then might be the structure of anxiety for
modernism? It was Jacques Lacan, a psychoanalyst
and follower of Freud who elaborated the theory
between 1935 and 1962: Lacan, a friend of the
Surrealists, of Andre Breton and especially of Sal-
vador Dali, always associated his theories with
those of art and expression, understanding art as
one of many ways in which the unconscious might
reveal itself. His first attempt at designating anxi-
ety as a “space” was in an essay first written in
1936, and delivered at the international psychoan-
alytic conference at Marienbad, three years after
Hitler’s coup, and the year of the Berlin Olympic
games – those games which were celebrated in
“Triumph of the Will” and which Lacan visited
after the conference. He entitled the lecture “The
Mirror Stage” and proposed, following the Belgian
psychologist Henri Wallon, that there could be
observed a moment in the life of the infant – at
around six months – when, like Narcissus in the
pool, the child would see itself and recognize itself
for the first time in a mirror. Waving its arms, but
yet unable to walk – Lacan imagines the child held
up in a baby-walker or trotte-bébé – the child for
the first time “recognizes” itself. But “itself” is the
problem and remains the problem for the rest of
life. For the “self” that is recognized in the mirror
is not a “self” but an image of self, a two-dimen-
sional picture, reduced in size and reversed, and
both silent and unable to register any of the interi-
or sensations felt but not understood of the mo-
ving, gesticulating baby. A picture, for ever sepa-
rated from the physical being that knows itself
only through this image and that for ever will be
trying to join itself up, to chase, to identify with its
remote identity. A split identity and a vain quest.
Forever the self will be seeking this image in the
“other” and not finding it. Hence paranoia, neuro-
sis, and most importantly schizophrenia, not as
unnatural states but as constitutional to a divided
self. 
Here the space of anxiety will be both the
space between the mirror and the image – the
space that will never render up a collapse, a truly
unifying closure – and also the space of the mirror
reflection, reflecting as it does not only the image
of the self, but also the image of the space in
which the self sits, and behind and around that
self. Separated by this space from oneself one is
deprived of any autonomy. Hence one’s fear of the
double, the spectral other, and the anxiety that
what one sees in the mirror might not be oneself.
Lacan links this anxiety to the idea of the uncanny,
which Freud in a famous essay of 1919 defined as
something which, “familiar” or homely, and long-
repressed into the unconscious, suddenly returns
and becomes “strangely familiar” or uncanny, liter-
ally unheimlich or “unhomely” in German.
Later, Lacan with theorize this mirror in anoth-
er way – a mirror that both reveals and hides, and
that in a famous optical experiment can be set up
in order to produce an illusion. This is the ex-
periment of Henri Boasse the geometer, where he
demonstrates the properties of a concave mirror to
provoke an illusion; 
There is something you see in section and which
is a mirror. A mirror does not extend to infinity, a
mirror has its limits… (thus) one can see some-
thing in this mirror starting at a point situated, if
one can say it, somewhere in the space of the
mirror where it is not, for the subject, perceptible.
Said in another way, I do not formally see my eye
in the mirror, even if the mirror aids me in seeing
something that I would not see otherwise. What I
can say from this, is that the first thing to advance
concerning this structure of anxiety…is that anxi-
ety is framed.
Lacan went on to speak of the celebrated case,
published by Freud, of the infantile neurosis of the
so-called “Wolf-Man” so-called because of the
dream he recounted where he saw in the uncanny
light of the moon shining through his bedroom
window, a pack of wolves seated on the branches
of a tree, looking at him through the window. In
this dream, the anxiety is framed, as pointed by
the phrase in his account: “suddenly the window
opened of its own accord, and I was terrified to
see that some white wolves were sitting on the big
walnut tree…This “sudden opening” indicated for
Lacan the process by which anxiety, once framed
broke in on the subject’s consciousness in a way
that reflects the mirror fantasm in his diagram. This
view, in which the viewer is viewed by the object
of his view, is also the structure of the uncanny.
Anxiety, then is framed through the mirror or its
substitute, the window, and has something to do
with a sudden revelation of what is not the sub-
ject, but that, precisely because it is not the sub-
ject’s identity, causes anxiety.
Anxiety is something else. Anxiety, is when
there appears in this frame that which was already
there much closer to the house: Heim, the host/
guest…In a certain sense, certainly, this unknown
host/guest (cet hôte inconnu) which appears in so
sudden a fashion has everything to do with what is
found in the Unheimlich, but it is not enough only
to designate it thus. Because, as the term indicates
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… in French, this host/guest, in its ordinary sense,
is already someone well worked over by waiting.
(l'attente, expectation)
It is this rising up of the Heimlich in the frame
which is the phenomenon of anxiety. And this is
why it is false to say that anxiety is without object.
Anxiety has another kind of object…
In architectural modernism, we can say that
this anxiety has been framed in a number of differ-
ent ways, each historically and culturally repre-
sented, but each corresponding to an attempt, as
Manfredo Tafuri, put it, “to ward off anguish by
understanding and absorbing its causes,” and not
only, as Tafuri holds, to ward off and absorb the
shock of metropolis, but also the “shock” of indi-
vidual anxiety, that precipitated by the understan-
ding that identity, individual as well as collective,
is, in modernity, subject to profound alienation. 
Let us then try to trace the historical trajectory
of this attempt, an attempt that explains the inter-
nalization of shock in the methods and formal pro-
cedures of the avant-garde, as well as the desire to
absorb anxiety in spatial models that contain, or,
in many cases, try to go beyond or resist anxiety in
the first place. 
And because the night is drawing on, and our
eyes are growing dimmer, I will conclude my talk
with what you may if you wish treat as an after-
dinner story-time. I will draw out of Lacan’s
entirely modern mirror stage story, a fable of four
mirror stages, giving myself the liberty to update
Lacan, even as he found it useful to update Narcis-
sus. In these four mirror stages, then, I will commit
psychoanalytical heresy and treat of the “mirror
stage” as if it might be relativized in successive his-
torical contexts, such that each moment of mo-
dernism might be seen to constitute its own spe-
cial kind of subject, each kind of mirror or screen
constructing a subject special to itself. And to
complete the heresy, I will imagine that our little
baby sitting so contentedly before its mirror (con-
tent that is before it’s driven into schizophrenia
and madness by the sight of its own reflection), I
will consider that this baby is an architect. And as
every story has to have a name, we might call this
story, the story of the “Archi-babes in the Mirror.” 
My first modern mirror stage would be set in
late nineteenth century Vienna: our baby architect
would be surely held in a prosthesis designed by
Schreber the elder, father of Freud’s Schreber,
inventor of mechanical aids for child deportment,
as terrifying as the writing machine in Kafka’s
Penal Colony. The mirror would be large, perhaps
full-length, spotted, and framed ornately in gilt
wood carved in the writhing shapes of pre-art-
nouveau soft-porn nymphs and satyrs. The combi-
nation of the iron frame enclosing our baby
designer, the shadow of nanny hovering in back-
ground, the animated eroticism of the mirror
frame (definitely not a Kantian parergon), would
surely produce a subject ripe for Freud’s couch,
but it would also construct a specific type of alien-
ating imago, one filled with vague neurasthenia,
riven with the mutual anxieties of agoraphobia and
claustrophobia, and doomed to live in jugenstijl
interiors, themselves, to use Benjamin’s terms, as
sterile as the electric wiring twining around their
coldly sexual decoration. The adult form of this
baby’s socialization would be perhaps that of
Adolf Loos, living, like Kafka, in a Chinese- puzzle-
land of little boxes, connected within other little
boxes in endless series, each one for a specific pur-
pose, each one of a different scale, each one
orthopedic, as Lacan would say, of a totality differ-
entiated by social function; each one incorporated
into the next in a totalizing game of what Loos
himself called three-dimensional chess: the game
of the raumplan. Outside the puzzle, however, in
the new public realm, our subject would be
dressed, Max Weber-style, without charisma, grey
overcoat, black tie, and homburg hat, ready for the
office. 
My second scene would be that of the original
Lacanian subject in the 1930s: surrealist and mod-
ernist at the same time, a space of struggle that, as
Benjamin put it, might somehow embrace both
André Breton and Le Corbusier in a single glance,
it order to epitomize an essential “modernity.” Our
child architect would be held up in its very French
trotte-bébé, or baby walker; replacing nanny, a
modern mother would now be at hand, her face
perhaps merging with the outlines of the baby’s
own reflection, while the room would be white, of
ambiguous spatial dimensions, and sparsely
furnished. The mirror would hold the transparency
of glass – both the glass house in which Breton
dreamed, and that which Le Corbusier, or better,
Mies van der Rohe, built. Its frame would be
chrome, perhaps designed in a circular form by
Eileen Grey, with a little enlarging glass extended
from its center so that the “relief du stature” of the
reflection would be distorted and reversed twice
over, as if depicted by Braque, or maybe worse,
Picasso. The socialized subject that developed
from this baby, might itself be divided. On the one
hand it would have the desires of a surrealist – of a
Matta, with his dreams of a soft, womb-like house,
or a Tzara, with nostalgic homesickness for the
uncanny space of the womb-like cave. Kiesler
would be a good example, never able to extricate
himself from the interior of his endless house
which was his exterior.
On the other hand, it would embody the mo-
dernist drive towards spatial power – those epito-
mized by Ayn Rand, who we might imagine
crossed-dressed as Cary Grant in the role of
Howard Roark, supremely confident of overcoming
the insufferable alienation of tactile-phobic, anti-
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city, anti-crowd, anti-woman, by a gesture towards
the “über-architektur”of the skyscraper. The search
for transparency, unity, and what Le Corbusier
called happily “l’espace indicible,” or “ineffable
space” (something akin, one imagines to the space
of de-realization experienced by Freud and Le Cor-
busier himself on the Acropolis) common to many
architectural dreams of modernism, would here be
related to the attempt of the alienated “I” to pass
through, like Alice, the mirror itself, rather than
assuming its armored reflectivity. The result would
be a subject in which the “I” captates itself within
the isolated and fortified “castle” of a glass tower
at the center of a landscape that, in Lacan’s vivid
description, bears a unnerving relationship to the
modernist “radiant city” in all its varied incarna-
tions:
The formation of the I is symbolized in dreams
by a fortress [un camp retranché], or a stadium –
its inner area and enclosure, surrounded by mar-
shes and rubbish-tips [son pourtour de gravats et
de marécages], dividing it into two opposed fields
of contest where the subject flounders in quest of
the lofty, remote inner castle whose form (some-
times juxtaposed in the same scenario) symbolizes
the id in a quite startling way.
An image that conjures up those visions of
Hilberseimer’s . 
The inhabitant of this city, as Lacan also notes,
might also find its subjectivity, its I, in an existen-
tialist alibi for the self, a kind of self-imprisonment
in which psychoanalysis would find the origin of a
socialization in a “concentrationnaire” form. Here
there would be no differentiation between inside
and outside; our baby would later grow up to
build a glass house for itself in Connecticutt, and
remain trapped for the rest of its life between
modernism and postmodernism.
My third baby is more tentative in its construc-
tion, and perhaps this is a natural result of our
contemporary immersion in its processes and
effects. It is a stage at once of refusal – a refusal of
reflection, of transparency, of extension – and of
resignation; resignation that the grand narratives
of introjection and projection that characterized
historicist and modernist space/time models no
longer hold. It is a space of absolute self-con-
sciousness of pre-history and post-history, as if the
baby architect, now held firmly by a dedicated
care-giver of any age and gender, knows all the
tricks; is aware somehow, as the psychoanalyst
Sami-Ali has proposed, that in looking at itself,
and denied its desire to capture the face of the
Mother, is committed to a split identity, not only
as between imago and I, but as between two Ima-
gos, so to speak, blurred and morphed into a dis-
torted physiognomy that is far from transparent or
clear, but rather opaque and translucent. It would
be as if this subject was truly “lost in space”, wan-
dering vaguely in a state of continuous psychasthe-
nia, disguising itself as space in space, ready to be
devoured by the very object of its fear. It would
be, finally, that we were dealing with a subject
whose Imago was screened and projected back to
it, not as reflection, but as a tv screen. This, the
subject of our third stage would be, then, some-
thing between an expressionist defending itself
against the void by ever more contorted shapes
and a hacker – in architectural terms would situate
it somewhere in the space between, let us say,
Frank Gehry and Greg Lynn.
My fourth, and last, baby is no longer tied to
tv: it is a truly digital subject. It has already gradu-
ated from hours of Sesame Street and Telly-Tub-
bies to Play Station 2, one who at the age of 15
plays Socom: The us Navy Seals, intently counting
up his kills and deaths while cnn plays the real war
on his tv. The mirror now, would be digital, not
analog, and subject to the endless morphing de-
scribed by architects like Greg Lynn or Karl Chu.
The subject’s image in the mirror would no longer
be reflected but scanned or digicammed into the
picture. In an initial, historical, moment of digi-
tilization, one would imagine this image to be in
black a white – a surveillance camera image; now
we are more likely to be asked to assume a hyper-
real, 3D image, or even a holographic laser gram.
A screen like William Gibson’s greyed-out, neuro-
mantic, computer screen; in a matrix that is, where
introjection and projection a merged in a timeless
state of warped and intersecting planes: what Gib-
son calls “a 3D chessboard extending to infinity.”
A matrix where no image of the alienated self
could be captured, where the subject if indeed it
could be called one would be self-identified only
in the mind, jacked in, as Gibson imagines, to the
half-mental half software worlds of abandoned
web sites and omnipotent IP controllers. I imagine
that the socialized version of this subject would be
found in a gaming arcade, playing Area 51 with a
red plastic gun. Later, as architect, it will repro-
duce its own dna in spatial terms, but now a space
that can only be experienced through mental sen-
sation, where the visual has, finally, been entirely
absorbed into a supra-sensory synthesis of all five
traditional senses, and, where, indeed, there is no
need to stray very far from the digital instruments
that induce the sensation of “architecture” – those
embedded bio-chips that the monopoly called
NanoSoft has made ubiquitous – and that allow us,
the nomads of flow, to take our constructions,
along with everyone else’s, wherever we go. 
Our fourth baby is, of course, an architect of
blurring. It is concerned to put into question all
the notions that architecture holds dear – of pre-
cise measurement, of precise location, of visual
clarity, of high resolution – and turn them around
with technology that exploits loss of position,
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fuzzy logic, obscure vision, and low resolution. It
wants to challenge our confidence in narrative, in
defined movement, and especially our tenacious
belief in time as an indicator of progress. In the
history of modern paradigms that we have
sketched, it sets itself up as the extreme case of
the unknown in the face of so much we think is
known. Of course, the dissolution of form into the
blur is, on one level, fundamentally non- if not
anti- architectural. It is, so to speak, the physical
realization of what Bataille called the informe, not
a different form, but something without any fixed
form, unreducible, save in its smallest atomic
structures, to any form. And yet, on another level
it is architectonic to the extreme, joining together
in a stroke, the constitutent idea at the heart of
the Kantian definition of architectonic, and the
potential of materially experiencing, in space, that
sublime whose essence is to be beyond experience.
For us then, the blur holds the status of the
sudden apparition in the Wolf-Man’s bedroom
window; not framed in the traditional sense, but
framed nevertheless by its status as an installation,
a specific event. But as an event it holds more than
paradigmatic meaning; for while it exists and is
experienced it functions as a kind of machine to
momentarily construct us according to its own
codes of identity. We are, immersed in the Blur,
for a moment, different subjects; subjects thrown
into a conscious three-dimensional enactment of
screen subjectivity. It is as if, in the droplets of the
cloud, we are ourselves pixilated, transformed into
digital subjects, with all the spacelessness that that
implies.
For, and this is my final point this evening, the
digital world, despite all the attempts we make to
bend it to our spatial will, is, in itself, not spatial at
all: represented on a two dimensional screen, or
through three-dimensional holograph simulation,
but in its essence it is a code, an infinite string – a
vector if you like – without internal coordinates of
space as we have known it, conceptually at least,
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over the last century or so. What this might mean
for architecture has hardly yet been explored: we
have been far too taken with the digital domesti-
cated as a mere tool – emulating or simulating
what we understand as perspectival reality,
whether in flight training or in three-d iteration.
This is simply the application of the digital to con-
vention. What a nanotecture might be is a matter
of pure speculation – of the kind that in the old
days we might have called utopia. But utopia, after
all, has always been the most radical form of cri-
tique of the present, and if we believe the present
demands such critique, then perhaps utopia is
what we need just now. I believe that we have
glimpsed a little corner of that utopia in the fog of
the blur. It is a utopia that returns us from the
visual to the haptic, a utopia in which we might, as
Benjamin wished, be lost for a moment, safe from
the tyranny of the spectacle, and immersed in a
world of porosity and touch, of hearing and smell,
of our bodies and those of others – a truly social
utopia that construes the other not as a typical
physiognomy, but as an unknown being to be
encountered and potentially discovered. Of
course, it may equally turn out to be a terrible
dystopia, a field for unbounded anxiety and blind
slaughter, of the kind intimated in the newly
released Doom III. But in a world where the grand
visions of architecture as savior and reformer have
been discredited, I will stand by those little events
that hold promise before I discard them into
Microsoft’s trash can and let the testimony of my
ten year old child stand as evidence that the Blur,
whatever its faults was, as he said with tears of
excitement in his eyes, a truly “humungous” expe-
rience; “I mean,” he concluded, “You can make a
building out of concrete and glass – that’s easy,
but out of a cloud – that’s magic!” 
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